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INTRODUCTION

Just last year, Southwestern Electric Power Company (“SWEPCO”)
shuttered its 642.1-MW Dolet Hills lignite power plant, operated by
Louisiana-based company CLECO, in Mansfield, Louisiana. 1 SWEPCO
agreed to completely retire the facility by 2026 in a settlement with Sierra
Club and other intervenors. 2 Dolet Hills’ closure, although a small
example, is representative of a national shift towards renewable energy. In
the last decade, solar energy experienced an average annual growth rate of
42%. 3 As of 2020, there are more than 100 gigawatts worth of solar energy
Copyright 2022, by MICHAEL R. BRASSETT, II. and BENJAMIN M. PARKS.
* Michael R. Brassett, II., Managing Member, and Benjamin M. Parks,
Associate, Bradley Murchison Kelly & Shea LLC.
1. Usman Khalid, SWEPCO to Shut Louisiana Coal Plant by End of 2026,
Explore Retirement of 2 Others, S&P GLOB. (Jan. 9, 2020, 9:58 PM), https://www
.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/010920-swep
co-to-shut-louisiana-coal-plant-by-end-of-2026-explore-retirement-of-2-others
[https://perma.cc/ZGF7-6MPY].
2. Id.
3. Solar Industry Research Data, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, https://
www.seia.org/solar-industry-research-data [https://perma.cc/559U-CWQY] (last
visited Feb. 28, 2022).
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infrastructure nationwide, generating enough energy to power 18.9 million
homes and creating more than 230,000 American jobs. 4
At least 16 solar power farms have been proposed in Louisiana, and if
all are completed, will create enough energy to power over 190,000
homes. 5 As of July 2021, only one utility-scale solar project, located in the
greater Baton Rouge area, has been completed, but construction and
development continue across the state. 6 Solar photovoltaic infrastructure
is among the cheapest sources of electricity generation, and solar power
generation costs dropped 89% between 2009 and 2019. 7 With the sharp
decrease in the cost of solar energy equipment, 8 the potential for job
creation, 9 and state tax exemption programs rendering Louisiana a
desirable destination for solar energy companies, 10 the sky is the limit for
solar energy development in the Bayou State.
The systems mainly used to convert sunlight into electricity are
photovoltaic panels and concentrated solar power.11 Photovoltaic solar
panels convert sunlight directly into electricity. 12 Massive amounts of
these panels can be placed on rural land in connection with utility-scale
projects, and the panels can even be affixed onto commercial buildings
and residential structures. 13 Concentrated solar power involves mirrors
that direct sunlight onto tubes containing liquid such as antifreeze, water,

4. Id.
5. Kristen Mosbrucker, Who Owns All These Solar ‘Farms’ Across
Louisiana? The Answers May Surprise You, NOLA.COM (July 26, 2021, 9:42 AM),
https://www.nola.com/news/business/article_f56004fe-de71-11eb-b161-c72a83
856b8b.html [https://perma.cc/5392-9WCC].
6. Id.
7. Myles Illidge, How Solar Power Became Cheaper than Coal,
MYBROADBAND (Jan. 22, 2022), https://mybroadband.co.za/news/energy/430042
-how-solar-power-became-cheaper-than-coal.html.
8. Id.
9. See State Solar Spotlight: Louisiana, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N,
https://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/Louisiana%20Solar-Factsheet2021-Q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/S52G-XPSB].
10. Louisiana’s Industrial Property Tax Exemption Program (“ITEP”)
provides an 80% break on property taxes for up to 10 years for projects on
primarily agricultural land being transformed into industrial sites. See
Mosbrucker, supra note 5.
11. See Norman Williams, Jr. & John M. Taylor, Alternative Electric Power
Sources—Utility-scale Solar Power, 5 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 96A:6
(Rev. ed. 2021).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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or synthetic oil. 14 The liquid is then heated at high temperatures and turned
into steam, and the steam spins a generator to produce electricity.15
Overall, solar energy infrastructure does not produce air pollutants or
greenhouse gases—the systems are quiet and passive. 16
The implementation of solar energy infrastructure in Louisiana
presents more benefits than burdens. The financial and economic
advantages associated with the solar energy industry should suggest that
solar development would be met with little to no controversy. Whether
that is true, however, remains undetermined.
Louisiana is one of the top five states nationally in natural gas
production and reserves. 17 In 2020, liquefied natural gas ("LNG”) exports
reached 2.4 million cubic feet, around 55% of which passed through two
Louisiana export terminals, Cameron LNG in Hackberry and the Cheniere
plant at Sabine Pass. 18 In March 2022, the first cargo of LNG left the new
Calcasieu Pass export facility in Cameron Parish; 19 and construction is
underway for a Plaquemines Parish LNG terminal. 20 With oil and natural
gas production at the forefront of the state’s economy, 21 Louisiana’s
reliance on fossil fuels is unlikely to change at any point in the near future.
However, the dependence on oil and natural gas production does not
foreclose solar energy development, but the latter’s expansion in
Louisiana provides fertile ground for disputes between surface owners,

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Solar Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 6, 2021),
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/solar/ [https://perma.cc/FK63-USN6].
17. See Louisiana State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=LA [https://perma.cc/B78
Y-MFLL].
18. See Mike Smith, Louisiana Has Bet Big on Liquefied Natural Gas. Is It a
Good Bet?, THE ADVOCATE (Oct. 31, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://www.thead
vocate.com/lake_charles/article_c7e1c0b8-3906-11ec-a42b-9faa447a8654.html
[https://perma.cc/R58P-PSAW].
19. UPDATE 2-First LNG Cargo Departs from Venture Global’s Louisiana
Plant, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2022, 2:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ven
ture-global-lng-calcasieu-idUSL1N2V40N3 [https://perma.cc/QJX4-QNNY].
20. Jacob Dick, Venture Global Awards Batch of Contracts for Plaquemines
LNG Development, NAT. GAS INTEL. (Mar. 13, 2022), https://www.naturalgasintel.
com/venture-global-awards-batch-of-contracts-for-plaquemines-lng-development/.
21. The petroleum industry accounts for almost 25%, or about $1.2 billion,
of Louisiana’s total revenues. See History of Oil & Gas in Louisiana and the Gulf
Coast Region, LA. DEP’T NAT. RES., http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/TAD
/education/BGBB/6/la_oil.html [https://perma.cc/F8TM-3GVC].
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mineral interest owners, and solar energy companies seeking to
concurrently exercise rights held in the same land. 22
Louisiana courts have yet to hear a case involving a conflict between
a mineral interest owner, a surface owner, and a solar company. However,
as Texas case law indicates, such a dispute is inevitable considering the
expanding solar energy development both in Louisiana and the nation. 23
This Article will examine Louisiana’s statutory and jurisprudential
authority, including the doctrine of correlative rights, to predict how a
Louisiana court may resolve a case involving competing rights between a
surface owner, mineral interest owner, and solar energy company in the
same piece of land. In undertaking such an examination, this Article will
discuss Texas’ accommodation doctrine and the recent application of the
accommodation doctrine to a dispute involving a solar energy producer.
I. A 1000 FOOT VIEW—LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW
A. The Framework of the Louisiana Mineral Code
Louisiana’s first commercial oil well came into existence in 1901 with
the discovery of oil near Jennings, Louisiana. 24 The well, situated atop a
rice field in Evangeline, Louisiana, initially produced 7,000 barrels of oil
a day. 25 The Civil Code was written without reference to oil and gas
development, so prior to 1975, Louisiana courts were tasked with crafting
law governing petroleum exploration and development. 26 The Louisiana
Mineral Code 27 brought long-awaited clarity to the equation, taking effect
on January 1, 1975. 28 Its provisions are supplementary to those of the Civil
Code and apply when the Civil Code is silent; in a conflict between the
two, the former prevails. 29 The Mineral Code, for the most part, is “a
codification of the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court on an array
22. See, e.g., Lyle v. Midway Solar, LLC, 618 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. App. 2020).
23. See, e.g., id.
24. See PATRICK H. MARTIN, LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE 30 (2012);
see also B.A. Wells & K.L. Wells, First Louisiana Oil Wells, AM. OIL & GAS
HIST. SOC’Y (Sept. 19, 2021), https://aoghs.org/petroleum-pioneers/first-louisi
ana-oil-well/ [https://perma.cc/8MQ8-MQH6].
25. Wells & Wells, supra note 24.
26. MARTIN, supra note 24, at 30.
27. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 31:1 (2021).
28. See Broussard v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 24 So. 3d 813, 816 (La. 2009).
Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 31:1–31:217 are cited as either articles of the
Mineral Code or as sections of the statutes. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:1.
29. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:2.
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of matters involving mineral rights.” 30 Gaining an understanding as to the
possibility of the existence of competing interests in a single piece of land
necessitates a general examination of the Mineral Code, specifically the
rights granted and obligations imposed thereunder.
The ownership of land does not include the ownership of oil, gas, and
other liquid or gaseous minerals found thereunder. 31 Conversely,
ownership of land does include the right to explore that land for those
minerals and reduce them to possession and ownership. 32 The landowner,
however, may transfer all or a portion of these rights. 33 According to
Mineral Code article 16, 34 the basic mineral rights that a landowner may
create are the mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease.
The mineral servitude is a right created by the landowner who has
conveyed or reserved all or a portion of his rights to explore and develop
his land for the production of minerals and to reduce them to possession
and ownership. 35 A mineral royalty is “the right to participate in
production of minerals from land owned by another or land subject to a
mineral servitude owned by another.” 36 The mineral royalty owner shares
in the financial gains of production but does so free of investment or
operating costs. 37 The mineral lease is a contract by which the minerallessee “is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals.” 38
The Mineral Code also recognizes the “executive right,” the right
possessed by a landowner (from which mineral rights have not been
severed), or owner of a mineral servitude, to grant mineral leases affecting
the specified land or mineral rights. 39 Conversely, the mineral royalty
owner does not possess “executive rights.” 40 In other words, the royalty
owner has no authority to grant mineral leases with respect to his or her
royalty. 41 The ownership of land and the executive right may be separated,
such that a vendor selling property may reserve unto herself the executive
right notwithstanding the passing of ownership of the land to the vendee
30. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Permission Granted: The Requirement of
Consent Under the Louisiana Mineral Code, 80 LA. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2020).
31. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:6.
32. Id.
33. MARTIN, supra note 24, at 75.
34. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:16.
35. See id. § 31:21; see also MARTIN, supra note 24, at 76.
36. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:80.
37. See id.
38. Id. § 31:114.
39. See id. § 31:105; see also MARTIN, supra note 24, at 181.
40. See MARTIN, supra note 24, at 181.
41. See id.
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through the sale of the property. 42 The severable nature of the executive
right “creates the potential for conflict between [the] landowner and the
owner(s)” of that severed executive right. 43
B. The Doctrine of Correlative Rights
An example of a conflict between holders of competing rights in the
same piece of land could occur as follows: W owns a tract of land in West
Baton Rouge Parish. W conveys the entire tract of land to X (“landowner
X”), but in the Act of Sale, W reserves for herself both the right to all oil,
gas, and other minerals in the land and the exclusive right to grant a
mineral lease covering the land. W’s reservation has created a mineral
servitude. 44 As the holder of a mineral servitude (and by virtue of the
reservation of executive rights), W possesses the exclusive right to execute
an oil, gas, and mineral lease covering the property notwithstanding the
fact that she sold it; however, X still owns the land.
Next, W executes a lease in favor of Oil Company Y. Oil Company Y
spuds a well that results in continuing production. While the oil, gas, and
mineral lease is still in effect, Solar Company Z approaches landowner X
to inquire about constructing solar energy infrastructure on the property.
Landowner X grants Solar Company Z a surface lease giving Solar
Company Z the right to operate a solar farm on the land. Fearing
interference with its current natural gas production, Oil Company Y files
suit seeking damages for trespass against landowner X and Solar Company
Z, requesting an injunction to accomplish removal of the solar panels.
To regulate this expected conflict between holders of competing rights
and interests in the same acreage, the state legislature promulgated the
doctrine of correlative rights, set forth in Mineral Code article 11.45
Although Louisiana courts have yet to resolve a dispute factually similar
to the aforementioned example, a discussion of article 11 proves useful in
predicting how a court would rule in such a dispute. 46 Section 31:11

42. See, e.g., Andrus v. Kahao, 414 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (La. 1981); Mt. Forest
Fur Farm of Am., Inc. v. Cockrell, 155 So. 228 (La. 1934).
43. See MARTIN, supra note 24, at 181.
44. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21; see also MARTIN, supra note 24, at 76.
45. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:11.
46. See Glob. Mktg. Sols., LLC v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., 153 So. 3d 1209,
1215 (La. 2014) (explaining that Mineral Code article 11 “contemplate[s] the real
rights and obligations that exist between parties who occupy the land
contemporaneously with a mineral lease.”).
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“contemplates concurrent uses of the land by the owner of mineral rights
and the owner of the land and those deriving use rights from him.” 47
Mineral Code article 11 provides that “the owner of land burdened by
a mineral right or rights and the owner of a mineral right must exercise
their respective rights with reasonable regard for those of the other.” 48 The
owners of “separate mineral rights in the same land” are also governed by
the standard of “reasonable regard.” 49 Where a vendor reserves mineral
rights in an instrument transferring ownership of land, the instrument
“must include mention of surface rights in the exercise of the mineral
rights reserved, if not otherwise expressly provided by the parties.” 50 As
Louisiana jurisprudence demonstrates, the standard of reasonableness in
section 31:11 is a fact-intensive inquiry. 51 It is a “flexible” standard
requiring “judicial interpretation to determine its impact on a given set of
circumstances.” 52
In Edwards v. Jeems Bayou Production Co., the Louisiana Second
Circuit Court of Appeal reviewed a trial court’s $4,375 damage award in
a suit brought by the plaintiff-landowner against a mineral lessee who had
drilled a well on plaintiff’s property that was shut-in 53 at the time of the
case. 54 Plaintiff alleged that the drill site, which occupied four acres of the
property, had been left in such poor condition that a tractor could not cross
the area. 55 The plaintiff further asserted that cables had been left in the
ground and pits were improperly filled. 56 Defendant had constructed an
iron ore road leading to the well that plaintiff contended “left the twelve
acre hay meadow [on the property] too small for cultivation.” 57
The Second Circuit cited Louisiana Revised Statutes section 31:11 and
noted that “the owner of land burdened by a mineral right and the owner
47. See Walton v. Burns, 151 So. 3d 616, 621 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
48. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:11(A).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 31:11(B)(1).
51. See Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1265 (La. 1999).
52. Id. (citing John M. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law
Under the New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 729, 811 (1976)).
53. A shut-in well is one “that could otherwise be productive, but is not
producing for some reason.” What Is a Shut-in Well?, MIN. RIGHTS CO., https://
www.mineralrights.co/2020/07/05/what-is-a-shut-in-well/ [https://perma.cc/NX
M7-B95A]. Common reasons a well is shut-in include low commodities pricing,
required well maintenance and nearby drilling activity. See id.
54. Edwards v. Jeems Bayou Prod. Co., 507 So. 2d 11, 12 (La. Ct. App.
1987).
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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of a mineral right must exercise their respective rights with reasonable
regard for those of the other.” 58 The court ultimately modified the lower
court’s ruling and awarded $2,175 in damages. 59 Included in the original
damage award was $1,200 allocated to “loss of hay.” 60 In amending the
lower court’s damage award, the Second Circuit noted that a lessee “has
the right to use the site reasonably necessary to conduct its operations and
to build and maintain an iron ore road to the site.”61 The evidence did not
indicate that any of the plaintiff’s growing hay crop was destroyed, and
the landowner was not entitled to recover for “loss of use of the [well] site
or road area for agricultural purposes.” 62 Although the Second Circuit was
not considering the rights of a solar energy company as lessee in a surface
lease upon acreage shared with a mineral interest owner, the Edwards
decision demonstrates how courts balance the rights and obligations of
parties with competing interests in acreage concurrently shared.63 The
court’s holding hinged on the “reasonableness” of the mineral lessee’s
actions upon the land—a fact-intensive inquiry. 64
Like in Edwards, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in
Ashby v. IMC Exploration Co. 65 emphasized that judicial inquiry under
article 11 should focus on whether use of the land was “reasonable.” 66 In
Ashby, the appellants had taken ownership of the surface rights of property
subject to a previously recorded mineral lease. 67 They argued that the trial
court erred in failing to award them damages for the “diminished use” of
the property which they asserted resulted from drilling operations of
defendant, IMC Exploration Co. (“IMC”). 68 The appellants claimed that
following the operations, they were no longer able to use the property to
establish a subdivision or residential trailer lots as they had intended. 69
The Third Circuit examined section 31:11 and noted that the statute
requires “[t]he owner of the land burdened by a mineral right and the
owner of a mineral right [to] exercise their correlative rights with

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
See id. at 13–14
See id.
Ashby v. IMC Expl. Co., 496 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id. at 1337.
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reasonable regard for those of the other.” 70 The court, in holding the
appellants had no right to recover “for diminished use of land arising out
of IMC’s reasonable, necessary exercise of its rights under mineral lease,”
stated that the record made clear that the defendant exercised its rights
under the lease in a reasonable and prudent manner.71 Further, IMC
restored the portion of the property not used in the production of IMC’s
well to its original condition. 72 In focusing on whether IMC’s use of the
land was reasonable, the Third Circuit held that the trial court’s
requirement that “negligence [was] a necessary precedent for recovery” is
“incongruous” with the language of section 31:11. 73
The Ashby decision is yet another example of how the finding of
liability under section 31:11 is dependent upon whether the defendant’s
operations on the land were “reasonable.” 74 Most notably, the Ashby court
stated that IMC’s operations resulted in the diminished use of the
appellants’ land. 75 However, the court’s conclusion did not necessitate a
ruling in favor of the appellants because, as the court made clear, IMC’s
operations were reasonable. 76 The Ashby decision is especially beneficial
in predicting how a Louisiana court would resolve a conflict as to land-use
rights between a surface owner, a mineral interest holder, and a solar
lessee. Although lacking a formulaic solution to solving such a dispute,
the case indicates that the reasonableness of oil and gas operations in light
of the facts presented would govern a court’s determination as to liability.
If the mineral lessee’s operations were “reasonable” as in Ashby, a court
could find for the mineral lessee and refuse to rule in favor of the solar
energy company—and vice versa.
Even prior to the passage of section 31:11, Louisiana state and federal
courts were still presented with litigation involving the correlative rights
of parties concurrently exercising operations that at times were conflicting

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See id. (“Accordingly, the appellants, who took ownership of the surface
rights of the property subject to the previously recorded mineral lease, have no
right to recover damages for the diminished use of the land, arising out of
IMC’s reasonable, necessary exercise of its rights under the mineral lease.”
(emphasis added)).
76. See id.
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on the same property. 77 Although the Mineral Code now provides much
clearer guidance on how to resolve legal disputes between multiple parties
possessing rights in shared acreage, the pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence is
still helpful in predicting how a Louisiana court would adjudicate these
conflicts.
In Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., the plaintiff, Pennington,
claimed to possess the exclusive right to explore and drill for oil and gas
on 2,425 acres of land pursuant to an oil, gas, and mineral lease Pennington
argued that he acquired—as lessee—from T.L. Mills, Jr., the owner of the
land. 78 Subsequent to the execution of the lease, defendant, Colonial
Pipeline Company (“Colonial” or “defendant”), purchased the title to 29
acres of the same land from Mills. 79 After its purchase of the land, Colonial
laid a pipeline for the transmission of its products and constructed
pumping and storage facilities. 80 Pennington intended to conduct
geophysical explorations on and under the property, including on
Colonial’s acreage. 81 He filed suit alleging that locating shotpoints 82 on
Colonial’s portion of the property was essential to “obtaining reliable
seismic information concerning the subsurface of the property.” 83 Thus,
Pennington requested that the court order Colonial to shut down its
operations on the land since Pennington’s rights under the lease were
“prior in time and superior in law.” 84
Specifically, Pennington requested that Colonial be ordered to shut
down all of its operations on the property, drain all pipelines that crossed
the property, drain all storage tanks on the land, shut down all electrical
service to the property, and remove any structures interfering with
Pennington’s geophysical exploration. 85 The court compared the rights
and obligations of Pennington as “the holder of the mineral lease” and
77. See, e.g., Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643, 649
(E.D. La. 1966); see also Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Kinnebrew, 99 So. 802 (La.
1924); Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1953).
78. See Pennington, 260 F. Supp. at 644.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. A “shotpoint” is “[o]ne of a number of locations or stations at the surface
of the Earth at which a seismic source is activated” when conducting mineral
exploration. See Shotpoint, SCHLUMBERGER OILFIELD GLOSSARY, https://
glossary.oilfield.slb.com/en/terms/s/shotpoint [https://perma.cc/W6VD-L5F2]
(last visited Mar. 1, 2022).
83. Pennington, 260 F. Supp. at 644.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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Colonial as “the owner of the fee title to the land.” 86 The court held that
each party’s rights in the shared acreage were “neither . . . superior to nor
inferior to” those of the other party. 87 Instead, the rights were “correlative”
and could “only be exercised in such a manner as not to unreasonably
interfere with the rights of the other.” 88 The court further ruled that to
allow Pennington to conduct seismic exploration in the manner proposed 89
would constitute an “unreasonable interference” with Colonial’s use of the
property. 90
In finding that Pennington’s proposed plan was an unnecessary,
unreasonable interference with Colonial’s land use rights, the court stated
that it was “unnecessary” for Pennington to “place any shotpoints
whatsoever on Colonial’s property,” but he had the option to do so in
exercising his rights under the lease so long as his chosen placement of the
shotpoints did not unreasonably interfere with Colonial’s pipeline
operations. 91 The court found that Colonial could reasonably elect, if
Pennington ultimately located some shotpoints on Colonial’s acreage, to
either: 1) shut down its pumps and electrical current only during the time
of the test shots or 2) shut down its pumps and electrical current for two
days while Pennington conducted the necessary surveys and recordation
of survey results in connection with all nine shotpoints. 92
The Pennington decision, although rendered before the enactment of
the Louisiana Mineral Code, is still good law and continues to be cited by
Louisiana courts. 93 The Pennington court focused its inquiry, as to the
parties’ competing rights in the land, on the “reasonableness” of the parties
actions vis-a-vis each other; the court also offered a fact-specific solution
whereby Pennington could conduct seismic exploration for minerals and
Colonial could continue to operate its pipeline facilities, with neither party
having rights superior to the other. 94 Pennington indicates how a court
could balance competing rights and interests of a solar energy company
and a mineral lessee, where the latter alleges that the former’s activities
interfere with its own—or vice versa—with neither party “deemed to have

86. See id. at 649.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 644.
90. Id. at 649.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 648.
93. See, e.g., Musser Davis Land Co. v. Union Pac. Res., 201 F.3d 561, 569
(5th Cir. 2000); see also Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374, 383 (La. 1988).
94. See Pennington, 260 F. Supp. at 648.
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a paramount right of use.” 95 A mineral lessee’s right to use the surface of
the leased premises “is not unfettered.” 96
Assuming the Louisiana State Legislature continues to remain silent
as to the rights and duties of solar energy developers leasing acreage
shared with a mineral lessee and surface owner, section 31:11 and the
jurisprudence interpreting the statute provide useful guidance as to how a
court may rule in adjudicating such issues.
C. Correlative Rights Under Sections 31:9 and 31:10
The doctrine of correlative rights is codified in articles 9 and 10 of the
Mineral Code. 97 Section 31:9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes states that
“[l]andowners and others with rights in a common reservoir 98 or deposit
of minerals have correlative rights and duties with respect to one another
in the development and production of the common source of minerals.” 99
Section 31:10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes provides that liability will
attach when a person with rights in the common source of minerals
“intentionally or negligently” uses his own rights so as to deprive another
of “the liberty of enjoying” their rights in the common source of supply. 100
A violation of article 10 also occurs when one intentionally or negligently
causes damage to another who possesses rights in the supply of
minerals. 101
Unlike in article 11, the imposition of liability under articles 9 and 10
for a violation of the correlative rights of another will occur only in the
presence of intent or negligence, and a finding of liability does not hinge
on a standard of reasonableness. 102 Further, whether a court would apply
95. See Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1265 (La. 1999)
(“Although the standard of reasonableness in Article 11 ‘constitutes legislative
form without specific content . . . the thrust of the rule is to permit concurrent use
of the land by the surface owner and the mineral owner with neither owner deemed
to have a paramount right of use.’” (citing McCollam, supra note 52, at 760)).
96. See id.
97. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:9, 31:10 (2021).
98. Both “reservoir” and “pool” seem to be synonymous as used in the
Mineral Code. Article 213 defines “pool” as an “underground reservoir containing
a common accumulation of crude petroleum or gas or both.” LA. REV. STAT. §
31:213(3).
99. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:9.
100. See id. § 31:10.
101. Id.
102. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10 cmt. (2021) (“Under Article 10, the
obligations of those having correlative rights in a common source of minerals
result in liability only if damage is intentionally or negligently caused.”).
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articles 9 and 10 to proscribe or approve of a solar energy company’s
operations on acreage shared with a mineral lessee and surface owner is
unclear because a solar lessee likely does not possess rights in a “common
reservoir or deposit of minerals.” 103 Rather, a solar lessee seeking to
conduct operations on shared acreage would likely be a surface lessee in
whose favor the surface owner executed a lease. 104 Nevertheless, since
application of the statutes to such a situation is not foreclosed by codal or
jurisprudential authority, a discussion of sections 31:9 and 31:10 is
beneficial. A court examining the rights and obligations of a solar lessee
could look to articles 9, 10, and 11 to hold that the solar lessee possesses
correlative rights, and the court could find that the solar lessee thus owes
correlative duties vis-a-vis a surface owner and mineral lessee.
In Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters
Subscribing to Cover Note 95-3317(A), 105 Mobil Exploration & Producing
U.S. Inc., (hereinafter “Mobil”)—an oil company—issued an invitation
for bids on the drilling of a well located in St. Mary Parish. 106 Cliffs
Drilling Company (“Cliffs”) forwarded a proposed contract to Mobil,
which the latter accepted. 107 Shortly after Cliffs began drilling operations,
a well “blowout” 108 occurred, and Cliffs later abandoned the operations. 109
Mobil, along with a multitude of other plaintiffs, filed suit against Cliffs,
various underwriters, and insurers. 110 The State of Louisiana intervened,
joining plaintiffs’ claims against Cliffs and the other defendants.111 The
trial court awarded $17,000,000 in damages to the State and other
plaintiffs for the loss of hydrocarbons due to Cliffs’ negligence in the
blowout of the well. 112 In examining whether plaintiffs had sufficiently
proven the State’s loss of an ownership interest in the hydrocarbons to be
produced from the property at issue, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal applied Mineral Code article 10 and the comments thereto. 113
103. See id. § 31:9.
104. See, e.g., Lyle v. Midway Solar, LLC, 618 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. App. 2020).
105. 837 So. 2d 11 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
106. Id. at 16.
107. Id.
108. A “blowout” occurs “when any amount of oil or gas is released
uncontrollably” from a well. See Derek Krieg, What Is a Blowout?, OILFIELD
BASICS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://oilfieldbasics.com/2018/10/11/what-is-a-blowout/
[https://perma.cc/3YCC-LJE6].
109. Mobil, 837 So. 2d at 16.
110. Id. at 16–17.
111. Id. at 17.
112. See id. at 30.
113. See id. at 36–39.
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The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling and found that
Cliffs’ negligence resulted in the blowout of the well, causing the loss of
“a considerable amount of hydrocarbons” that would have otherwise been
available for commercial production. 114 The court found that article 10
“provides a remedy to a person with rights in a reservoir when the value
of his rights has been diminished by the negligent or intentional acts of
another.” 115 Cliffs’ negligent operations in drilling the well, the Mobil
court ruled, fell within the purview of section 31:10. 116
Mobil involved a dispute between an oil company, co-owners of
various mineral rights, and a drilling company. As previously mentioned,
the application of section 31:10 to a solar energy company’s operations is
questionable—and there are no reported Louisiana decisions addressing
the issue. However, the Mobil court’s holding as articulated suggests that
a Louisiana court could look to article 10 to decide a case involving a solar
lessee. In articulating its ruling as quoted above, 117 the court appeared to
indicate that although article 10 protects the rights of individuals with an
interest in a common reservoir, it can be applied to the negligent or
intentional acts of one who does not possess rights in that common
reservoir. For example, a solar energy company could be conducting
operations on land, situated above a common reservoir, in which multiple
individuals or entities possessed a mineral interest. If the company
negligently or intentionally infringed upon the rights of those parties by
obstructing or damaging an oil company’s drilling equipment, then the
parties “deprive[d] . . . of enjoying [their] rights” 118 to the minerals could
use article 10 to seek recourse against the solar energy company. In other
words, while a solar lessee benefitting from the provisions of article 10 is
unlikely, the solar lessee could potentially be found liable under article 10
for a violation of its provisions. A court’s application of Louisiana Mineral
Code article 11 to solve a dispute between owners of competing interests
in the same property seems much more plausible, but an application of
article 10 in that context is nonetheless possible. 119

114. Id. at 39.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 39.
118. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:10 (2021).
119. The comments to article 10 provide, in pertinent part, that the article
“furnishes the necessary flexibility to Louisiana courts to deal with problems of
correlative rights.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10 cmt. (2021).
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II. THE ACCOMMODATION DOCTRINE
Unlike in Louisiana, Texas case law sets forth a detailed analysis—
the accommodation doctrine—to guide courts in hearing cases involving
competing rights in surface use and mineral interests on shared acreage. 120
Under Texas law, a party possessing “the dominant mineral estate” has the
right to go onto the surface of the land burdened by the mineral estate to
extract minerals. 121 Incidental thereto is “the right to use as much of the
surface as is reasonably necessary to extract and produce the minerals.” 122
Where the mineral interest holder or mineral lessee has only one method
in developing and producing the minerals, he is able to use that method
“regardless of whether it precludes or substantially impairs an existing use
of the servient surface estate.” 123 However, Texas stare decisis places a
limit on the dominance of the mineral estate and requires rights stemming
from the mineral estate to be exercised with “due regard for the rights of
the owner of the servient estate.” 124 Where mineral operations would
preclude or impair an existing use by the surface owner, and where
“established practices in the industry” provide alternatives, the “rules of
reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative
by the lessee.” 125
Much like Louisiana jurisprudence citing Mineral Code article 11,
Texas case law also emphasizes the reasonableness of a party’s
operations. 126 In Texas, however, courts and litigants alike are guided by
the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, which
presents a formulaic recitation of standards—known as the
accommodation doctrine—applicable to cases concerning competing
rights of use in shared property. 127 The doctrine balances the rights of use
of both surface owners and mineral owners, and it simultaneously
“recogniz[es] and respect[s] the dominant nature of the mineral estate.” 128
120. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971); see also
Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013); Lyle v. Midway
Solar, LLC, 618 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. App. 2020).
121. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248–49 (citing Tarrant Cnty. Water Control
& Improvement Dist. No. One v. Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. 1993);
Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 621).
122. See id. at 249.
123. See id. (citing Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 911; Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 622).
124. See Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 621.
125. Id. at 622.
126. See, e.g., id. at 621–22.
127. See id. at 618.
128. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 250.
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According to Getty Oil, a surface owner seeking legal recourse by
asserting that the mineral lessee has failed to accommodate an existing use
of the surface bears the burden of proving that “(1) the lessee’s use
completely precludes or substantially impairs the existing use, and (2)
there is no reasonable alternative method available to the surface owner
by which the existing use can be continued.” 129 If the surface owner meets
this burden, he or she must prove further that “given the particular
circumstances, there are alternative reasonable, customary, and industryaccepted methods available to the lessee [or holder of a mineral
interest]” 130 that allow the lessee to recover minerals and the surface owner
to continue his or her existing use. 131 In proving the second element of the
accommodation doctrine—that there exists no reasonable alternative
available—the surface owner cannot prevail by simply arguing that “the
alternative method is merely more inconvenient or less economically
beneficial than the existing method.” 132 Rather, the surface owner must
show that “the inconvenience or financial burden of continuing the
existing use by the alternative method is so great as to make the alternative
method unreasonable.” 133
In December 2020, the Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso, applied
the accommodation doctrine to issue a ruling that Louisiana courts and
legislators should look to for guidance 134 in deciding the rights and duties
of a solar energy company. 135 While the appellate court’s holding in Lyle
v. Midway Solar, LLC would not bind a Louisiana court, it would assist
129. See id. at 249 (citing Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 628).
130. It should be noted that application of the accommodation doctrine is not
limited to situations where the party seeking to conduct mineral exploration and
production activities is a “mineral lessee.” Rather, the defendant in Getty
happened to be a mineral lessee, and thus the genesis of the doctrine’s standards
refers to a “lessee.” See, e.g., Lyle v. Midway Solar, LLC, 618 S.W.3d 857 (Tex.
App. 2020). The Lyle plaintiffs were mineral interest owners and had not executed
mineral leases with any well operators, and the appellate court applied the
accommodation doctrine to resolve the case. See id.
131. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 249.
132. See id. (citing Getty Oil, S.W.2d at 628 (“We have not held, as some have
stated, that the issue is a question of inconvenience to the surface owner.”)).
133. See id. (citing Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 628).
134. Both the comments to the Louisiana Mineral Code and Louisiana
jurisprudence covering mineral law issues are guided by jurisprudence from other
energy-dependent states such as Texas. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. cmt. §
31:10 (2021) (citing Texas jurisprudence); see also Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas
Co., 606 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Rein, 534 P.2d 1277 (Okla. 1974)).
135. See Lyle, 618 S.W.3d at 862.
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the court in resolving similar factual and legal issues. The plaintiffs in this
case, Kenneth Lyle and Linda Morrison (the “Lyles”), owned 27.5% of
the mineral rights in a 315-acre tract of land in Pecos County, Texas. 136
Gary D. Drgac owned 100% of the surface rights in the tract but owned no
mineral interest therein. 137 Drgac, as surface owner, entered into a lease
with Midway Solar, LLC (“Midway”). 138 The lease granted Midway “free
and unobstructed use and development of solar energy resources” for up
to 55 years. 139 In allowing Midway to place solar panels on the property,
the lease also provided that Midway could place transmission, electrical,
and cable lines anywhere on the property subject to Drgac’s consent. 140
The surface lease acknowledged that Drgac did not own mineral
interests on the property, and, through execution of the lease, Midway
acknowledged therein that Drgac did not have a “right to control” the
operations of the mineral owners. 141 Midway ultimately constructed solar
energy infrastructure on 215 acres, approximately 70% of the surface
land. 142 The Lyles filed suit against, among others, Midway and Drgac,
seeking damages for trespass and breach of contract; the Lyles also alleged
that construction of the solar facility had “destroyed and/or greatly
diminished the value” of their mineral estate. 143 In response, Midway and
Drgac filed motions for summary judgment arguing that the
accommodation doctrine governed the case, rendering Midway as owing
no duty to the Lyles. 144 The appellate court noted from the outset that the
Lyles had never leased their interests in the minerals to oil and gas well
operators and had no plans to do so, nor had the Lyles ever commissioned
a geological study of the land or entered into a drilling contract. 145 The
Lyles conceded that they did not plan to drill any wells on the property. 146
The court agreed with Midway and found that the accommodation
doctrine applied to the case as a “sound and workable basis for resolving
[the] conflicts between [the parties’] ownership interests.” 147 Under the
doctrine, Midway argued that although its solar energy infrastructure
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See id.
Id. at 863.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 865–66.
Id. at 863.
Id.
Id. at 869.
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could at some point in the future potentially interfere with the Lyles’
mineral interest, the Lyles did not “have the unilateral right to dictate”
Midway’s use of the surface acreage for its operations. 148 The Lyle court
ultimately held that any trespass or breach of contract claim asserted by
the Lyles was “premature.” 149 Midway’s activities, the court held, could
not be considered an encroachment on the Lyles’ surface rights “until the
Lyles actually seek to exercise their rights.” 150 It must be mentioned that a
petition for review by the Texas Supreme Court has been filed. Thus, the
appellate court’s decision could be modified. Further, if the Lyles are
found to have engaged in exploration and/or drilling operations at the time
the petition for review is ruled on, their operations as mineral interest
owner could necessitate a different result. Regardless, the Lyle decision
presents an example of how a Texas court, and also a court in Louisiana,
could adjudicate a case involving solar energy development atop land
burdened by both surface and mineral interests.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Louisiana courts have yet to be presented with a
factually similar dispute to that in Lyle. However, in cases where conflicts
arise between a surface owner, a solar energy company as surface lessee,
and a mineral interest owner or mineral lessee, Louisiana Mineral Code
articles 9, 10, and 11—and the cases citing these articles—provide
guidance in balancing and protecting competing rights held by those
parties in property they use concurrently. Texas’ accommodation doctrine
and the Lyle case provide an additional avenue though not binding
precedent for a Louisiana court to explore when faced with such issues.

148. Id. at 874.
149. Id. at 875.
150. Id.

